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Introduction
This brief essay has two main objects. The first is to
examine how well the central economic tenets with
respect to industrialisation, trade and economic
growth which have guided UNClAD's work since its
inception have stood the test of time. Its second main
purpose is to enquire what modifications are required
in intellectual outlook and emphases to best meet the
Organisation's basic goal of rapid economic and
industrial progress in the Third World in the changed
circumstances of the world economy.
Industrial Growth in the Third World
The main theses of Dr Prebisch, the intellectual
founding father of UNCTAD,1 with respect to the
interrelationship between trade, industry and develop-
ment may be rationalised and summarised as follows.2
Owing to the low income elasticity of demand for
primary products in the developed countries and other
factors, there was a long run tendency for the terms of
trade of developing countries to deteriorate over time
[see Prebisch 1957; Bacha 1978]. In the structural
approach to economic growth which Prebisch
espoused, manufacturing was the engine of growth
and industrialisation was the key to economic
development [see Singh 1981]. However, in view of the
fact that income elasticity of demand for the import of
manufactures in less developed countries is very high
(and much greater than the world income elasticity of
demand for developing countries' exports of com-
modities), an increase in the tempo of growth in the
developing countries would inevitably lead to balance-
of-payments disequilibria. To forestall such dis-
equilibria, it was essential that the developed countries
should be willing to accept manufactured exports
from the developing countries on a non-reciprocal
basis as well as provide aid and other capital flows.3
The other leading economists who made major contributions to ihis
intellectual approach were Hans Singer, W. Arthur Lewis and the
late Ragner Nurkse.
See also Abrahamian's [i984] excellent discussion of ihis subject.
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The economic history of the last few decades suggests
that at a very important level, this approach to
economic development has stood the test of time
remarkably well. As Table 1 indicates, the developing
countries made rapid industrial progress during the
period 1960-80. Their share of world manufacturing
production, though still very small, increased by
nearly 50 per cent, from 6.9 per cent in 1960 to 10.2 per
cent in 1980. Disaggregated data for individual
industry branches shows that Third World industrial-
isation during these two decades has also been widely
based: the Third World countries significantly
increased their share of world production both in light
industries and in heavy industry. As a result of this
industrialisation (and that of the socialist countries,
also shown in Table 1), there have not only been
far-reaching changes in the location and structure of
world industry, but also a major transformation of the
economic structure of the developing countries
themselves. The share of manufacturing industry in
GDP in these countries rose from an average of 13.4
per cent in 1960 to 19.7 per cent in 1980.
These developments were accompanied by similar
changes both in the structure of world trade and the
exports of the developing countries. The latter's share
in the world exports of manufactures increased from
less than four per cent in 1960 to nine per cent in 1980.
In the 1960s, in the developed market economies,
imports of manufactures from the Third World
increased at much the same rate as the former's
imports from the rest of the world (chiefly their intra-
trade). However, during the 1970s imports from the
Third World rose at about twice the rate of the latter,
leading to concern about 'de-industrialisation' of
industrial countries on account of cheap labour
imports from the Third World.
I Papers in this Bullet/n by members of UNCTAD's Secretariat
describe the Organisation's operational work in implementing the
policy conclusions from these theses. Colin Cireenhill's paper
outlines the history of UNCTAD's involvement in attempts to
obtain greater access to developed country markets for Third World
manufactures.
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Table I
Structural changes in the world industrial economy:
1960-80
manufacturing output (value added) for major
economic groups
44
developed market-economy countries
Source: UNCTAD 1981
The favourable picture outlined above refers of course
to the 'average' (in the statistical sense) developing
country. Economic and industrial progress in the
Third World has by no means been equally distributed
among countries - it would not be expected to in view
of the wide diversity in the levels of economic, social
and political development in these nations at the
beginning of the period being examined. Nevertheless,
it is important to remember that the industrially most
successful Third World nations have included
countries like India, China,4 Mexico and Brazil where
the bulk of the Third World's population lives.
If we now turn from an examination of long-term
trends over the time span 1960-80 to the most recent
period, there are pressing reasons for disquiet. As
Table 2 shows, since the second oil crisis of 1979, there
has been a sharp decline in the rate of economic
growth of the Third World countries. Although
China, India and other Asian countries have
continued to grow at their previous trend rates, for the
Third World countries as a whole, there was no
increase in per capita GDP in 1981 and 1982.
Economic performance in 1983 was worse still;
preliminary data suggest that per capita GDP in the
developing countries declined by one per cent last year
World Bank 1984]. Similarly, Third World manu-
facturing production has been hard hit by the world
economic crisis. Industrial production and capacity
have continued to expand in India, China and other
East Asian economies, but in Africa and Latin
America industrial production has fallen sharply and
in many countries there is evidence of a massive de-
industrialisation. For example, in Tanzania, which is
fairly typical of low-income sub-Saharan African
countries, manufacturing production has fallen by 25
per cent in each of the last two years and industry is
currently working at only 20 per cent of its capacity.
Similarly in Latin America, even in the industrially
most advanced countries of Brazil and Mexico,
production, employment and capacity utilisation in
industry have decreased significantly during the last
two years.
Is the recent adverse economic experience of the Third
World countries simply a short-term aberration? Will
these countries soon automatically climb back to their
long-term trend rates of growth or will it be necessary
for them to follow rather different economic strategies
and policies than they did in the past? Can the Prebisch
theses outlined earlier satisfactorily explain these
recent developments? Will the operational and policy
conclusions which UNCTAD has drawn from the
Prebisch approach remain valid in the foreseeable
future? These urgent questions will be examined in the
following sections.
The Slowdown in the World Economy
It is certainly an arguable proposition that the
economic retrogression of the developing countries
during the last four years is entirely due to the world
economic crisis. The most important channels
through which the slowdown in world economic
The argumeni remains valid even f China is excluded from the
analysis. UNIDO [19791 indicates that between 966 and 1975 lO
countries accounted br nearly three quarters of the total grciwth of
manufacturing production in the Third World (other than China
and other Asian socialist countries): Brazil, Mexico. Argentina.
South Korea. India, Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and
Thailand. 60 per cent of the Third World's population lived in these
countries in 1975.
1960 1970 1980
Value added (US dollars bn at 1975 prices)
developing countries 49 101 218
DMEC' 533 942 1358
socialist countries 119 283 572
total 701 1326 2150
Contribution to GDP (per cent)
developing countries 13.4 15.7 19.7
DMEC' 24.3 26.5 27.8
socialist countries 24.6 30.7 36.7
total 23.1 25.9 28.4
Share in world manufacturing output (per cent)
developing countries 6.9 7.6 10.2
DMEC' 76.0 71.1 63.2
socialist countries 17.1 21.3 26.6
total 100.0 100.0 100.0
1960- 1970-
1970 1980
Average annual growth (per cent)
developing countries 7.6 8.0
DMEC1 5.9 3.7
socialist countries 9.0 7.3
total 6.6 4.9
Table 2
Growth of GDP, 1960-82 major economic groups
estimated
2 does not include South Africa
Source: World Bank 1983
activity since 1979 has affected industrial and
economic development in the Third World are the
following: a) a reduction in the demand for Third
World products, particularly commodity and mineral
exports; b) as a consequence of a), a fall in commodity
prices and hence adverse movements in the terms of
trade; e) an increase in the real burden of interest and
debt service payments partly due to a) and b) and
partly due to an enormous increase in interest rates; d)
a reduction in the quantum of aid and other capital
flows.
During 198 1-82, commodity prices fell by 25 per cent
in US dollar terms, the largest continuous decline in
more than three decades. In real terms, ie deflated by
the price índex of manufactures exported by the
developing countries, the fall was 20 per cent, and
brought commodity prices to their lowest level since
the Great Depression. Although prices have improved
during 1983, they still remain very low in historical
perspective [IMF 1983]. With respect to interest rates
the real eurodollar rate - using developing countries'
export prices as a deflator - increased from about -5
per cent in 1976-79 to +20 per cent in 1981, and about
+ 18 per cent in 1982 [World Bank 1983, Figure 2.3, p 9].
The three factors a), b) ande) above have played havoc
with the balance of payments situation of the non-oil
developing countries. Their combined current account
deficit rose to $108 bn in 1981 and to $87 bn in 1982,
about twice the average annual level during 1977-80.
However, as the IMF's Annual Report of 1983 points
out, 'For the oil importing developing countries, the
entire deterioration of the combined current account
balance from 1978 to 1981 can be ascribed essentially
to these three adverse factors' [as reported in IMF
1983a1.
Both from an analytical and policy point of view the
following aspects of the world economic crisis in
relation to the developing countries seem to me to
deserve special attention.
First, the deterioration in the balance of payments
position of the developing countries, which as seen
above is due mainly to external factors, has far-
reaching consequences for all spheres of the economy,
real as well as financial. The external payments
constraint can become so binding that the country has
to curtail not only the imports of luxuries or other
consumer goods, but also the essential imports
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country group
1980 GDP
(billions of
dollars)
average annual percentage growth
1960-73 1973-79 1980 1981 19821
all developing countries 2,231 6.0 5.1 3.0 2.0 1.9
low-income 544 4.5 5.1 6.1 3.7 3.7
Asia 492 4.6 5.6 6.6 4.1 3.9
China 283 5.5 6.3 6.8 3.0 4.0
India 159 3.6 4.4 6.6 5.6 2.8
Africa 52 3.5 1.5 1.2 0.1 0.8
middle-income oil importers2 920 6.3 5.5 4.2 1.1 1.1
East Asia and Pacific 204 8.2 8.5 3.6 6.9 4.2
Middle East and North Africa 28 5.2 2.9 4.7 0.1 2.7
sub-Saharan Africa2 43 5.5 3.7 4.0 3.7 4.0
Southern Europe 201 6.7 5.0 1.5 2.4 2.2
Latin America and Caribbean 444 5.6 4.9 5.7 -2.4 -1.2
middle-income oil exporters 687 7.0 4.8 -1.3 1.5 1.9
high-income oil exporters 221 10.7 7.5 7.5 -1.8 -11.7
industrial countries 7,395 5.0 2.8 1.3 1.0 -0.2
required for maintaining the existing levels of
domestic production.
It is because the necessary complementary inputs in
the form of industrial raw materials, spare parts, etc
can no longer be imported into countries like
Tanzania, Mexico or Brazil, that the level of industrial
capacity utilisation has become so low and industrial
production has declined. The dollar value of Mexico's
imports fell by almost 40 per cent in 1982 and by 70 per
cent from the first quarter of 1982 to first quarter of
1983. The fall in the dollar value of Brazil's imports
was 12 per cent and 23 per cent in the corresponding
periods, on top of an earlier fall in 1982 [World Bank
1984]. Similarly in Tanzania, it is estimated that the
level of imports today is 25 per cent below its 1970
volume.
Reduced industrial production has adverse effects on
other parts of the economy. Thus agricultural
production becomes handicapped directly as well as
indirectly by the non-availability of foreign and
domestic industrial inputs (eg fertilisers), trans-
portation or incentive goods for farmers (which again
are mainly industrial). These disequilibria in agri-
cultural and industrial production in turn generate
inflation and disequilibrium in government finances.
In many developing countries, sales and excise taxes
on industrial production and import duties are a
major source of government revenue, so that the
balance of payments constraint is directly and
indirectly responsible for the enormous increases in
budget deficits or the public sector borrowing
requirements which these countries are experiencing.5
Again taking the Tanzanian example, it has been
estimated that if industry were operating at a normal
level of capacity utilisation instead of its present low
level, sales and excise tax revenues would be doubled,
which would not only climate the current fiscal deficit,
but also make a sizeable contribution to the capital
account [see JASPA/ILO 1982].
The second important point concerning the present
world economic crisis is that it is not some random
event, but has been caused by the structural features of
the world trade and payments system and the
economic policies of the advanced countries. The
highly restrictive policies of 'monetary restraint'
followed in the US, UK and other advanced countries
since 1979 have been directly responsible for the
extraordinary economic slump the world has
witnessed in the last few years. It is also significant that
the main cause of the slump is not protection, but what
This is the familiar distinction between a cyclical and a structural'
budget deficit which is often made with respect to budget deficits n
the US and in other advanced countries. Unfortunately, the ¡MF
invariably ignores such distinctions in relation to the developing
countries.
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I have called elsewhere a system of beggar-my-
neighbour competitive deflation. Under the present
trading and financial regime, even wtthout creating
any trade barriers, when each country attempts to
achieve a balance on its payments or reduce inflation
by deflating its economy, it pushes other countries into
deficit and the net outcome is a vicious circle of
deflation. This is what the world economy is suffering
from today rather than beggar-my-neighbour pro-
tection. Instead of trade barriers, it is precisely the lack
of such barriers in the movements of capital in the
advanced countries, particularly the short term capital
movements across the exchanges, which have played a
major role in this process of competitive deflation.
Thirdly, an implication of the earlier analysis is that if
the world economy were to revive, the developing
countries would in general gain through exactly the
same channels by which they are presently dis-
advantaged, ie through increased commodity prices,
increased export demand and, hopefully, through
increased aid and capital flows. However, the
initiative and ability to undertake measures for such a
recovery lie entirely with the US and other advanced
countries. There is little the developing countries
(because of their small share of world economic
activity) can do to increase world economic growth.
It is fashionable these days to stress the two-way
interdependence between the Third World countries
and the industrial countries. At one level this is
certainly correct since in 1982 the developing countries
accounted for 27 per cent of the total OECD exports
and for about 40 per cent of US exports. In the second
half of the 1970s, the South provided a net stimulus to
the OECD economies by its faster rate of growth of
production and hence its rapid expansion of demand
for OECD imports, financed largely by foreign
borrowings. However, in 1982, with a contraction of
imports by many developing countries, the South's net
contribution to OECD economic activity was most
likely negative. But, as noted before, the developing
countries were forced to reduce their imports by the
lack of foreign exchange earnings which was largely
due to economic policies followed earlier by the
leading OECD countries. There is a fundamental
asymmetry in the interrelationship between the
developing and the developed countries which derives
from the former's need for imports of capital goods
and technology and therefore for hard currency
earnings. These are essentially determined by the rate
of growth of the OECD economies, which in turn is
mainly governed by economic policies and interactions
amongst these countries alone. As the OECD
economists Larsen, Llewellyn and Potter [1983]
rightly observe: 'In the short term, non-OECD
markets can occasionally grow buoyantly and
somewhat independently of general world conditions.
[However], over a run of years, non-OECD imports
are constrained by their export proceeds. The latter
are determined in substantial part by the growth of the
value of the relevant imports of OECD countries,
largely primary commodities'.6
The fourth aspect of the present world economic crisis
which deserves attention is that the events of the last
few years may not simply be a temporary
phenomenon, but instead herald a long-term
deceleration in the expansion of world economic
activity. This would have extremely serious impli-
cations for long-term industrial and economic policies
in the developing countries as well as for UNCTAD's
policy programme.
UNCTAD's Future Programme
UNCTAD was born in the middle of a golden age for
the Western industrial economies, and in many ways
for the world economy as a whole. This golden age
spanned the quarter century before the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system and the oíl price rise of the
early 1970s. The average annual growth rate of GNP
in the OECD countries from 1950 to 1973 was 4.9 per
Cent, compared with 1.9 per cent between 1913-50 and
2.5 per cent during 1870'-l913 [Reynolds 1983]. For
more than two decades, until 1973, countries like
France, West Germany and Britain maintained
virtually full employment, an unusual phenomenon
for capitalist economies. In fact, these countries were
not only able to employ their own available labour
forces, but also to give jobs to a significant number of
workers from abroad. In the 1960s in West Germany
and France, immigrant workers constituted something
like 10 per cent of the employed labour force. In this
golden age, as noted earlier, a number of Third World
nations also made major industrial strides.
The historically high long-term rates of growth of
output, consumption, and employment achieved by
the advanced countries in the 1950s and 1960s were
accompanied by an enormous increase in world trade.
World exports of manufactures grew at an unpre-
cedented long-term rate of over 10 per cent per annum
- an expansion in which again a number of Third
World countries also participated.
However, over the last decade, the rate of expansion of
both world trade and of world economic activity has
halved or less than halved. In the formulation of
economic and industrial policy for Third World
countries a major parameter to be determined is: what
is likely to be the future long term rate of growth of the
world economy? Is it likely to go back to its previous
trend-rate of 1950-73, or is it more likely that the much
On this point, see also Professor Sir Arthur Lewis's Nobel lecture,
[1980] and Taylor's excellent paper [1982].
reduced rate experienced during the past decade will
continue (which incidentally is much more in line with
the long historical record over 1850 to 1950)?
Although obviously no firm answers can be provided
to this question, there are a number of extremely
important factors which suggest that the world
economy may grow much more slowly than it did in
the golden age [see for example Reynolds 1983;
Kindleberger 1982]. Thus, the Third World countries
have to contend with the probability that the rate of
growth of the world economy during the next decade
may not be significantly greater than it has been
between 1973 and 1983.
The crucial consequence for the Third World of the
expected long-term deceleration in world economic
growth is that world trade will expand much more
slowly than in the 'golden age'. However, the Third
World countries continue to require an annual rate of
economic growth of 6 to 7 per cent and of industrial
growth of about 10 per cent for compelling economic
and social reasons: to reduce absolute poverty and to
expand employment opportunities for a growing and
increasingly urban population [ILO 1976; Singh 1979;
UNCTAD 1981]. These two factors seem to me to
necessitate a re-examination of the traditional
UNCTAD approach to the relationship between trade
and development. For if overall trade increased very
slowly, then even if there were no tariff or non-tariff
barriers in advanced countries to imports of Third
World manufactures, the latter would still probably
only be able to grow at a pace unable to generate the
socially required rates of economic expansion in the
developing countries. Furthermore, the slower growth
of world economy activity may mean that the adverse
movements in the terms of trade which the developing
countries have experienced during the last decade may
not be reversed.
The policy conclusion which follows from this analysis
is that in the coming decade the countries of the South
will have to rely much more on their internal
dynamics, on the growth of internal demand, rather
than on world market forces to generate economic
expansion. They will need greater import substitution,
more internal technological development and more
economic and technological cooperation among
themselves.
It must be recognised that such a programme is easier
for the large semi-industrial countries like Mexico,
Brazil or India to implement than for the smaller or
less developed economies. This is for two reasons.
First, the 'large' size of the former means that they are
in principle much more capable of insulating
themselves from the impulses of the world economy;
foreign trade normally accounts for a relatively
smaller proportion of their GDP as they usually have
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large enough internal markets to reap economies of
scale. In principle, the rate of growth of such
economies is therefore much less dependent on the
growth of the world economy. Secondly, the semi-
industrial economies already possess fairly diversified
industrial sectors with trained manpower, managerial
and organisation skills, so that on the supply side, they
have possibilities of self-sustained internal growth to a
degree much less open to economies at lower levels of
industrialisation.
It should, however, be stressed that the policy
emphasis on internal growth in large developing
countries does not mean that export opportunities or
the export effort should be neglected. For example
many semi-industrial countries have an enormous
export potential in the Middle Eastern markets (in
contention with the industrial countries) as well as in
other developing economies. Some of them (cg India,
China, Korea) also have opportunities for increasing
their foreign exchange earnings by 'export' of labour
to the Middle Eastern oil producers. In view of the
external financial gap which many semi-industrial
countries will face for a long time to come (not least
because of previous debt accumulations), it is clearly
necessary for them to make full use of such
opportunities to the mutual benefit of themselves as
well as of the Middle East oil producers. Similarly,
they should seek to extend their exports to the
advanced countries to the extent that is possible. The
main burden of the analysis presented here is that in
order for the NICs to continue to achieve fast growth
in a slow-growing world economy, the essential
dynamic will have to be provided increasingly by
internal factors rather than by the external economy.
The problems which small countries face in such a
situation are far more difficult and some of them may
even be intractable. Small countries must necessarily
rely on trade and specialisation in order to achieve
industrial development. There have therefore been a
number of schemes for the establishment of common
markets of contiguous countries to promote these
aims. However, these integration schemes in the
developing economies have to date not been
conspicuously successful. The main reason is the large
differences in the levels of development of the various
countries; in a free trade situation, the more developed
regions or countries have a tendency to develop even
further without commensurate development in the less
developed regions [Kaldor 1970]. For example, it is
certainly arguable that industrial development in a
country like Tanzania was aided by that country's
withdrawal from the East African common market
and thus from competition with the more advanced
Kenyan manufacturing industry. Nevertheless, in-
dustrialisation in smaller developing countries does
require much more intra-developing country trade;
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the latter is more likely to increase and to aid the
development of all participating countries if it is
planned rather than free trade. Despite all the
difficulties and disappointments, in the period of slow
growth of world activity and trade, it would be all the
more essential for UNCTAD to continue and
strengthen its role in this area by helping to create and
implement such arrangements.
Contrasting Experiences of Industrialising
Economies
In the context of the above discussion it is interesting
to reflect on the contrasting experiences during the
present world economic slowdown of India and China
on the one hand and of Mexico and Brazil on the
other. It was noted in section l(see T4ble 1) that the
world's two leading poor economies, India and China,
have done relatively very well in the recent period,
despite the world economic crisis. The main reason for
their success lies in the fact that since their
independence, these two countries have deliberately
followed policies of 'self-reliance', based on import-
substitution, and 'inward looking' industrial strategies.
Over the last 30 years, they have established their own
technical and scientific infrastructures, and developed
a range of capital goods and defence industries.7 The
result is that today the rate of economic growth of
either India or China is more or less independent of
world economic growth. The indigenous factors - cg
the weather and the growth of agriculture - are far
more important in determining the expansion of these
economies than the world economic situation. It is an
irony of the structure of the world economy today that
in this particular respect, these two poor countries are
far better placed than a rich industrial country like
France. France has had among the highest long-term
rates of industrial growth in Western Europe during
the last two decades; it also has huge gold reserves; it
has a socialist President committed to expansion of
employment and production. Yet France's economic
growth is almost entirely determined by the economic
policies of Chancellor Kohl and President Reagan.
Lt may be argued that India and China have been
successful in creating self-reliant economies because of
their large size. There is some truth in that, but not the
whole truth. France is also a large country. So are
Brazil and Mexico, each of which is also much richer
than either India or China. However, Brazil and
Mexico are today in deep economic crisis, and unless
the world economy has a spectacular revival, or other
arrangements between the borrowers and lenders can
be negotiated, these two countries are likely to he
condemned to negative or very low economic growth
for much of this decade. The essential reason for these
Among the Third World countries, India has n fact emerged as the
leading exporter of technology [Lall 1984].
economic differences between Brazil and Mexico on
the one hand, and India and China on the other is, that
during the last 15 years the former chose to follow
export oriented, outward looking industrial strategies
based on multinational investment and foreign debt.
As a consequence Mexico and Brazil developed highly
import-dependent industrial structures. During the
golden age, these countries benefited from their
greater integration with the world economy in much
the way orthodox economics extols the virtues of
increased trade and specialisation. However, their
industrial structures which were suitable for the
golden age, also left them vulnerable to prolonged
economic disruption when the world economy ceased
to expand.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion indicates that the central
economic theses of Dr Prebisch remain valid in the
changed circumstances of the world economy; if
anything they are even more applicable in a slow
growing world economy. In conditions of reduced
long-term world economic growth, even if the terms of
trade of the commodity producing countries do not
deteriorate further, they are unlikely to revert to their
previous peaks. For this reason, and more importantly
to achieve the socially necessary rates of economic
growth, the developing countries have no choice but to
continue with their attempts to change the structure of
their economies by industrialisation. The lesson which
many of the African and Latin American countries
have to learn from the recent set-backs to their
industry is not that their objective of industrial
development was incorrect, but that the industries
which they established, although they may have been
appropriate for the golden age, have turned out to be
unsuitable in a period of slow growth of world
production and trade. The diversification of these
economies from producing mineral or agricultural
commodities to the production of manufactures did
not, as envisaged, reduce their degree of dependence
on the world economy; instead the latter appreciably
increased as the industries which were established
were highly import-intensive.
it does not of course follow from the experience of Mexico and
Brazil thai ah Countries which have in the past, or which continue at
present to pursue 'outward oriented' economic policies are bound to
fail during a period of slow growth of the world economy and worid
trade. For even if world trade shrinks, any single country (or a smaB
group of countries) following a strategy of export-led growth can
certainly be successful in increasing its share of trade and achieving
a relatively fast expansion of the economy. However, such a
solution is not feasible for the Third World as a whole, particularly
for the larger countries. For a further discussion of this issue see
Singh [1984].
Reducing the propensity to import will require a reconsideration of
economic policies on the demand as well as the supply side. This
raises a wide range of issues which are more fully discussed in Singh
[1984], from which i have borrowed passages for this paper.
In the short-term, those developing countries
constrained by their balance of payments, whether
Brazil, Mexico or Tanzania, have no choice but a) to
reduce their propensity to import and b) to enhance
their import capacity to the extent that this is possible.
However, in a slow growing world economy, even in
the long-term, the creation of viable industrial
structures requires strategic attention to be focused on
both a) and b), particularly the former. In view of its
origins in the golden age, UNCTAD as an
organisation, in its operations and policy programme,
has traditionally been much more concerned with b)
than with a). This balance urgently needs to be
redressed.
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